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CONSENSUS AND CONTRARIANISM  
ON CLIMATE CHANGE
HOW THE USA CASE INFORMS DYNAMICS ELSEWHERE
Maxwell t. boykoFF
Against a contrasting backdrop of consensus on key issues on climate science, a heterogeneous 
group dubbed climate «skeptics», «contrarians», «deniers» have significantly shaped contemporary 
discussions of climate science, politics and policy in the public sphere. This essay focuses on the 
USA context, and explores some of the intertwined social, political and economic factors, as well as 
cultural and psychological characteristics that have together influenced public attitudes, intentions, 
beliefs, perspective and behaviors in regards to climate change science and governance over time. 
This article makes the case that the USA example can inform developments elsewhere; as such it is 
important to consider these contextual elements to more capably appraise «contrarian», «skeptic», 
«denier» reverberations through the current public discussions on climate change. 
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In September 2014, United States President Barack 
Obama delivered a speech at the United Nations 
Climate Summit regarding the seriousness of climate 
change and the need to take action to address it. He 
stated: «There is one issue that will define the contours 
of this century more dramatically 
than any other. That is the urgent 
and growing threat of a changing 
climate… Nobody gets a pass 
[and] we will do our part…» 
(Mauldin & Sparshott, 2014). 
Immediately following 
his statement, many offered 
familiar laments about the chasm 
between scientific consensus that 
humans contribute to climate 
change and lack of policy action, 
fueled by obstructionist postures 
of those commonly referred to as climate «skeptics», 
«contrarians» or «deniers». These outlier perspectives 
have been identified in various ways, from shills of 
carbon-based industry interests to politicians (e.g. US 
Congressional Republicans), renegade academics or 
«hobbyists» (Dunlap, 2013; Victor, 2014).
For example, US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) Chief Gina McCarthy argued that 
action should be taken not «despite the economy» 
but «because of it», forcefully adding that it was 
«sad» that climate contrarians «hide behind the 
word “economy” to protect their own special 
interests» (Barron-Lopez, 2014). As another example, 
US Senator Bernie Sanders 
commented: «This is a crisis and 
we’ve got [to] address it. The 
bad news is that Republicans 
in Congress, many of whom 
don’t even believe the scientific 
consensus that global warming 
is a growing threat to our planet, 
continue to block legislation 
to address the planetary crisis» 
(Cox, 2014). 
At first glance, one may 
choose to dismiss this 
dissonance as noise in the system. Holding firm 
to indefensible «do-nothing» positions given the 
overwhelming evidence that humans are contributing 
to climate change, and that the impacts are 
tremendous (Field, Barros, Mach, & Mastransrea, 
2014) can be seen as foolish. However, taking 
these dissenting views into account through more 
measured consideration reveals the many different 
«IN THE USA, “SKEPTICISM”, 
“CONTRARIANISM”, AND 
“DENIALISM” HAVE BEEN 
SEEN TO BE PARTICULARLY 
EVIDENT, FROM THE HALLS 
OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO 
EVERYDAY US CITIZENS»
Mery Sales. «Ecocides» series, 2015. Oil on panel, 60 cm in diameter.
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cultural, political, economic, psychological and social 
elements to these discursive stances that make it more 
challenging to simply «name, shame and blame» 
the individual or collective culprits for the positions 
they take up (let alone get them to change). This 
article focuses on the USA case, where «skepticism», 
«contrarianism», and «denialism» have been seen 
to be particularly evident, from the halls of federal 
government (e.g. US Congress) to everyday US 
citizens. However, it is a mistake to think of these 
issues as merely anomalous US American challenges: 
these are cultural, political, economic, psychological, 
and social elements that pervade perceptions and 
decision-making on climate change elsewhere. 
This article consequently makes the case that 
interrogations of consensus and skepticism on climate 
change in the USA can help inform considerations of 
consensus and skepticism on climate change in other 
political and cultural contexts elsewhere (e.g. Spain, 
France, UK, Australia, India, China, Japan).
n SKEPTICISM, CONTRARIANISM, DENIAL
In various ways, skeptics, contrarians or deniers have 
worked to counter efforts seeking to mobilize public 
action on climate challenges. Over time, researchers 
have sought to develop more exacting definitions of 
these groups in order to provide greater texture to the 
motivations of their work and the implications of their 
varied influences regarding climate change. 
Many mention that skepticism forms an integral 
and necessary element of scientific inquiry. However, 
its use to describe outlier views on climate change 
has been less positive, often because the skepticism 
derived from ideology is often prominent over 
skepticism derived from scientific evidence. The term 
skeptic has been most commonly invoked to describe 
someone who dismisses the scientific evidence 
that climate change is a problem and that humans, 
in part, contribute to the problem. Considering 
contrarians, Aaron McCright (2007) has defined 
climate contrarians as those who vocally challenge 
what they see as a false consensus of mainstream 
climate science through critical attacks on climate 
science and eminent climate scientists, often with 
substantial financial support from fossil fuels 
industry organizations and conservative think tanks. 
Saffron O’Neill and I further developed a definition 
of «climate contrarianism» by disaggregating 
claims-making to include ideological motives behind 
critiques of climate science, and exclude individuals 
who are thus far unconvinced by the science or 
individuals who are unconvinced by proposed 
«DEEPLY ENTRENCHED SKEPTICISM 
REGARDING SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS  
OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE HAS BEEN 
EVIDENT FOR MANY CENTURIES»
In various ways, skeptics, contrarians or deniers have worked 
to counter efforts seeking to mobilize public action on climate 
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solutions, as these latter two elements can be more 
usefully captured through different terminology 
(O’Neill & Boykoff, 2010). Meanwhile, Kari Marie 
Norgaard (2006) has focused on the aspect of denial, 
and has developed three dimensions as they relate 
to environmental issues: literal (sheer refusal to 
accept evidence), interpretative (denial based on 
interpretation of evidence) and implicatory (denial 
based on the change/response that acceptance would 
necessitate). The use of the term denier (or its variant 
denialist) has been criticized for its unnecessary 
and inappropriate implicit link to other movements 
of denial; nonetheless this is a term that has gained 
traction in popular discussion. 
Taken together, these efforts have sought to 
provide greater texture to the motivations behind, 
and implications of expressions of skepticism, 
contrarianism and denial regarding climate change. 
In common parlance in the public arena, invocations 
of these terms have been overlapping. And while 
skepticism and denialism have been often favored 
terms invoked in the public arena to describe 
ideological – rather than scientific – contention, 
‘contrarianism’ is seen to be the most accurate and 
least inflammatory way to do so.
Political economic interests can be seen as a 
frequent motivator behind skeptical, contrarian, or 
denialist/denier statements made on climate change, 
and these are not to be overlooked (Oreskes & 
Conway, 2010). For example, as Charles and David 
Koch question the fundamentals of whether the 
climate is changing or whether humans play a role 
in climate change – taking up outlier views far from 
those of relevant expert science communities on these 
issues – they can also be seen to align themselves 
with right-wing think tanks like Americans for 
Prosperity in order to protect their over $40 billion in 
oil and gas assets and interests that could face threats 
from climate-related regulations (Mayer, 2010).
Yet, adding to these political economic motivations, 
important cultural characteristics and psychological 
factors are also intertwined, together influencing 
underlying attitudes, intentions, beliefs, perspective, 
and behaviors in regard to climate change science 
and governance. For example, in 2009 the 
American Psychological Association took up the 
interdisciplinary task of examining and articulating 
these connections in a report Psychology and Global 
Climate Change. Their stated entry point into 
the topic was that climate change is an issue «not 
easily detected by personal experience, yet it invites 
personal observation and evaluation» (Swim et al., 
2009, p. 1). Dan Kahan has continued to examine 
these dimensions through cultural cognition, where 
people’s perceptions are found to be shaped largely by 
their values and by their role models (Kahan, Jenkins-
Smith, & Braman, 2010).
n THE ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SKEPTICISM
Looking at this historically, deeply entrenched 
skepticism regarding scientific claims of 
environmental decline has been evident for many 
centuries, as demonstrated in British colonial 
documentation. In the first half of the nineteenth 
century, numerous members of the scientific 
community – mainly botanists and doctors – warned 
governments in the UK and the colonial periphery 
about the dangers of damaging ecosystem services 
during this process of ‘taming’ the wild and 
migrating to new parts of the planet. Although British 
government officials were responsive to immediate 
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and major crises – such as a famine or drought – these 
creeping environmental challenges were given very 
low priority (Rajan, 2006). Often, with the passage of 
the immediate crisis, civil administrators would raise 
skeptical objections about the claims of the scientists 
regarding environmental decline. For example, Robert 
Baden-Powell – a lieutenant general in the British 
Army and colonial forestry advocate – observed: «In 
the official mind up to the highest, we find various 
degrees of disinclination towards vigorous conviction: 
and just as we find in the people the progress of 
conviction barred by self-interest, so is it with their 
rulers. Considerations of interest, such as the desire 
to have no complaints and have everything snug and 
quiet in the district, to show a good revenue sheet 
by yielding forest produce... affect their capacity 
for the reception of a sure belief in forest economy» 
(Rajan, 2006, p. 235). Thus, this skepticism stemmed 
not merely from skepticism regarding scientific 
evidence of the decline of ecosystem services, but 
also from the implications that such a decline had for 
ongoing, unfettered colonial expansion and capitalist 
exploitation of resources for profit. 
These roots and shoots of skepticism regarding 
scientific evidence and skepticism emergent 
from ideology, spread through many associated 
environmental issues (like climate change) in 
contemporary spaces and places. For example, in 
the USA variants of dissent – described through 
climate skepticism, contrarianism and denial – have 
pervaded and often polarized politics, culture and 
society (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Recognizing 
roots connected to British colonization, US-strains of 
climate contrarian movements developed from a wider 
historical context of conservatism mapping onto anti-
environment stances that took hold in the late 1960s 
and ‘70s, around the time of a wave of progressive 
environmental legislation in the United States. 
Among resistance movements were the Sagebrush 
Rebellion and the Wise Use movement, which, under 
the direction of charismatic and well-connected 
leaders, sought to reform public land management 
with privatised decision-making and rights (Dunlap 
& McCright, 2011). Yet in the mid to late 1980s, in 
the context of Reaganomics and corollary efforts 
to reduce the regulatory power of the EPA and the 
Department of the Interior, climate contrarianism 
became articulated in full form as anti-regulatory and 
anti-environmental, and neoliberal environmental 
movements emerged in the public arena. These 
historical and cultural interactions spawned the 
cynical term «wise contrarians» to describe those 
who have populated the public sphere and have drawn 
«IN THE MID TO LATE 1980S, CLIMATE 
CONTRARIANISM BECAME ARTICULATED 
IN FULL FORM AS ANTI-REGULATORY AND 
ANTI-ENVIRONMENTAL, AND NEOLIBERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS EMERGED 
IN THE PUBLIC ARENA»
Resistance movements such as the Sagebrush Rebellion and the 
Wise Use movement sought to reform public land management 
with privatised decision-making and rights, generally under the 
direction of charismatic and well-connected leaders. In the 
image, cover of Time (23 October 1995) picturing the farmer Dick 
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from historical influences from Wise Use movements 
(Boykoff & Olson, 2013). These amplified views 
have been seen to be a reflection of right-of-center 
perspectives amid a complex mix of contemporary 
cultural politics. As such, the Republican Party 
platform of 2012 articulated a repudiation of 
Agenda 21 – developed at the 1992 United Nations 
Rio Summit that was considered the blueprint for 
sustainable development in the coming century – 
through newfound suspicions of global governance 
in order to fuel long-standing distaste for regulatory 
intervention at all levels (Boykoff & Olson, 2013). 
Moreover, as neoliberal and utilitarian ideologies 
mapped out onto carbon-based industry interests, 
they also adhered themselves to US Republicanism, 
skepticism, contrarianism, and denialism. Some 
see this as a toxic mix that pollutes considerations 
of this form of international 
environmental cooperation. And, 
these resistances all feed quite 
nicely – for those opposing US 
government action – into efforts 
that seek to muddy the waters 
of decision-making on climate 
change.
Research by Riley Dunlap 
and Aaron McCright (2011) has 
focused on these opposition 
movements in the US, and 
has examined how certain 
individuals worked – at times 
through media attention – to 
develop competing discourses 
that disempowered top climate 
science during the Newt Gingrich-led «Republican 
revolution» of 1994 to effectively gain a foothold in 
national and international discourse on the causes of 
climate change. Such efforts have also continued to 
receive support from the US Chamber of Commerce, 
which hired lobbyists and spent millions of dollars 
on advertising contrarian views about climate 
science and policy. The US Chamber of Commerce 
has received contributions from numerous carbon-
based industry groups over past decades to help 
fight climate legislation and question scientific 
understanding of the issues. Robert Brulle (2014) 
has traced carbon-based industry funding through 
a complex network of groups such as Donors Trust, 
to identify how certain skeptical, contrarian, and 
denialist voices are amplified in the public arena.
Moreover, many contrarian initiatives in the US 
have been tied to carbon-based industry funding 
sources. For example, there has been the «CO2 
is Green» advertising campaign, launched in the 
summer of 2010. Running in The Washington 
Post, the advert was a piece of an ongoing larger 
campaign by a group bearing the same name. In their 
words: «Our mission is to support scientifically and 
economically sound public policy on environmental 
issues. Currently, we are especially concerned with 
federal proposals that would interfere with nature’s 
dependence on carbon dioxide (CO2) [...] CO2 is 
Green is working to insure that all federal laws or 
regulations are founded upon science and not politics 
or scientific myths» (CO2 is Green, 2010). The group 
sought to contest the notion that carbon dioxide (CO2) 
is a pollutant, and thus protest legislation that aimed 
to mitigate CO2 emissions. These particular claims 
were enabled through financial backing by coal 
interests, in particular H. Leighton Steward (Mulkern, 
2010). His documented carbon-
based industry career has also 
been punctuated by his role as 
Chair of the US Oil and Gas 
Association and the Natural 
Gas Supply Association, and 
as an honorary Director of the 
American Petroleum Institute 
(Mulkern, 2010). While far from 
universal, CO2 is Green can be 
seen as a representative skeptic/
contrarian/denier endeavor 
where asymmetrically powerful 
«astroturf» groups rail against 
the «climate establishment» and 
where highly sophisticated and 
rapidly adaptive campaigns often 
seek to protect vested interests. 
n CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
Against a contrasting backdrop of consensus on 
key issues on climate science, a heterogeneous, yet 
loosely configured group of people dubbed climate 
«skeptics», «contrarians», or «deniers» have now 
achieved veritable «celebrity status» in contemporary 
discussions of climate science, politics and policy 
in the twenty-first century public sphere (Boykoff 
& Olson, 2013). While it may also be tempting to 
dismiss such skeptical, contrarian or denialist efforts 
as isolated, fringe, anomalous, or geographically 
specific, they actually represent one of many 
contested spaces in the larger battlefield of decision-
making regarding global political economy and 
energy production as well as public engagement with 
climate change. 




INTERESTS, THEY ALSO 
ADHERED THEMSELVES 
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Moreover, when contrasting these views with 
notions of consensus, and when casting these 
perspectives as «outliers», it may be tempting to 
assemble a taxonomy of contrarianism, skepticism 
or denialism. However, this approach runs multiple 
risks. Among them is the risk of overlooking the 
context through overemphasis on the individual 
as locus of agency. It can be a mistake to focus 
on the claims-makers at the sacrifice of critical 
consideration of the claims they make. Blanket 
assertions of climate skepticism, denialism or 
contrarianism across a range of distinct science 
and governance issues, risks rejecting potentially 
legitimate and useful critiques out of hand by way of 
dismissing the individual rather than the arguments 
put forward. Treatment of individuals through (often 
demonizing) labels may work to identify «outliers», 
but may fail to shine a light on the contours of their 
problematic arguments. 
It can also be a mistake to excessively focus 
on individual personalities at the cost of critically 
considering political, economic, social, psychological 
and cultural forces at work. In other words, challenges 
arise when the gaze on the individual claims-
makers subsumes deeper structural or institutional 
questions. Jo Littler (2009) has commented that 
the political economic and societal dimensions 
can often be lost when the focus is on atomized 
alternatives for action. This has also been referred 
to as a shift to «responsibilisation», where climate 
change becomes the responsibility of the individual 
in place of governments or regulators who might 
affect significant policy changes through altering 
production and distribution (Littler, 2009). In the case 
of climate change, highly individualized scrutiny 
meshes with highly individualized ways to take 
action (e.g. changing lightbulbs, turning off lights, 
recycling etc.). Other scholars have posited that this 
shift toward a focus on arguing personalities is part 
of larger movements in a «new green order» where 
commodified and highly-individualized solutions 
«MANY CONTRARIAN INITIATIVES IN 
THE US HAVE BEEN TIED TO CARBON-
BASED INDUSTRY FUNDING SOURCES. 
FOR EXAMPLE, THE “CO2 IS GREEN” 
ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN»
Above, the «CO2 is Green» advertising campaign, launched in 
the summer of 2010 in The Washington Post. The group seeks 
to contest the notion that CO2 is a pollutant and protest against 
legislation aimed to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions. Below, a 















«THROUGH THE PROCESS OF NAMING, 
SHAMING AND BLAMING THE OTHER, 
THERE IS A TENDENCY TO OVERLOOK 
COMMON RESPONSIBILITIES ASSOCIATED 
WITH ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATE CHANGE»
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are seen to actually move citizens further away 
from considering their role in requisite collective 
institutional shifts towards decarbonization. Together, 
these trends and foci can serve to distract citizens 
from the scale of the challenges associated with 
contemporary climate change, and from more 
textured dimensions of institutional analysis of how 
climate science and governance interact, as well as 
contestation therein. 
Another key risk is that through the process of 
naming, shaming and blaming the «other», there 
is a tendency to overlook common responsibilities 
associated with anthropogenic 
climate change. As we 
collectively hurtle through the 
new millennium, the complex 
and multi-faceted issue of 
climate change is an issue 
that cuts to the heart of our 
human relationship with the 
environment. It cuts to the heart 
of how we live, work, play and 
relax in modern life, and thus 
critically shapes our everyday 
lives, lifestyles and livelihoods. 
To the extent that naming, 
shaming and blaming distracts 
from their common responsibilities, it then often 
actually serves the interests of the named, shamed 
and blamed.
Therefore, when considering the contrasts 
between consensus and skepticism on climate 
change, it is critically important to remain mindful 
of the importance of context, as well as the dangers 
of excessive focus on those dubbed «skeptics», 
«contrarians» or «deniers». Moreover, what happens 
regarding debates and discussions of consensus and 
skepticism in the USA, does not merely stay in the 
USA; instead, it pervades ongoing discourses in other 
cultural and political contexts. Overall, if excessive 
attention to unfounded dissent narrows, rather than 
widens a spectrum of possible considerations of 
the full scope of diagnoses and prognoses, course 
corrections are in order. 
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